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The Unyielding Right to Assist Civilians in Gaza – EJIL: Talk!


The United Kingdom, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates began airdropping humanitarian assistance into Gaza in the last days of July. They did so as the number of children dying of starvation grew. The extent of hunger and its causes in Gaza are detailed in a July 30 post by Dannenbaum and de Waal here. As they and others have explained, airdrops can provide only minimal help. Still, as soon as the UK announced its plans, Israel consented to the airdrops and to limited access by road as well as pauses in its air strikes to facilitate deliveries.

Do states need Israel’s consent? Would they lose the right to assist if consent were withdrawn? The answer is no in the circumstances of Gaza. States and the United Nations have a robust right to provide assistance regardless of consent. As a practical matter, the more willing the cooperation of parties to a conflict, the more effective humanitarian aid will be in saving lives. Nevertheless, knowing the extent of assistance rights can be a factor in negotiating cooperation. Such negotiation can also help pave the way to ending the conflict–the indispensable factor to the end of suffering.

The right of assistance arises from duties owed by parties to an armed conflict to populations deprived of basic needs due to hostilities. The most prominent duties are the prohibition on using starvation as a method of warfare (ICRC, Customary Law Study, Rule 53) and the duty to ensure the population’s survival (1949 Geneva Conventions Additional Protocol I, Art. 69; 1949 Geneva Conventions Common Article 3). Other duties with respect to Gaza include those imposed on Israel specifically by the International Court of Justice to prevent genocide, also detailed by Dannenbaum and de Waal in their July 30 post.

The ICRC has restated the right in the Customary Law Study, Rule 55: “The parties to the conflict must allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief for civilians in need, which is impartial in character and conducted without any adverse distinction, subject to their right of control”. The meaning of “subject to their right of control” is not straightforward. It may depend on the category of conflict—international or non-international—and other factors. Dörrman and Ferraro describe the right of control as belonging to a party to the conflict exercising effective control (Handbook of International Humanitarian Law, p. 354). That would be Israel in the case of Gaza. The meaning is not decisive with respect to the right to assist because whoever holds the right of control “must allow and facilitate … humanitarian relief.” Consent must be requested but may not be refused in such circumstances. Dörmann and Ferraro put it this way: “There may thus be circumstances under which, as a matter of international humanitarian law, a party to a conflict may be obliged to accept an offer of services” (Handbook of International Humanitarian Law, p. 355). The request for consent is really a form of notice in cases of severe deprivation.

This position is reinforced by the fact that failure to consent gives rise to the right of aid providers to take countermeasures. The Institute of International Humanitarian Law (San Remo) addressed this issue in its 1993 Guiding Principles on the Right to Humanitarian Assistance. The Guiding Principles have apparently rarely been invoked. Their influence is discernible in related documents, such as the Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters. But there has been little need for the Principles themselves. Gaza is a unique conflict with respect to the rejection of humanitarian assistance.  

From March to May 2025, Israel prevented all outside assistance from reaching Gaza. It attacked an aid ship in early May. By June it finally established the “Gaza Humanitarian Foundation” together with the United States to replace UN coordinated assistance. The GHF has been “disastrous”. According to de Waal, “there’s no case of such minutely engineered, closely monitored, precisely designed mass starvation of a population as is happening in Gaza today.”

So, the Guiding Principles are needed now for this tragic conflict. Principle 2 follows Rule 55 and treaties to provide: “The right to humanitarian assistance implies the right to request and to receive such assistance, as well as to participate in its practical implementation”. The threshold of application is easily met in Gaza. Principle 3 provides “The right to humanitarian assistance may be invoked: (a) when essential humanitarian needs of human beings in an emergency are not being met, so that the abandonment of victims without assistance would constitute a threat to human life or a grave offence to human dignity …”. The type of aid is limited to “material indispensable to the survival of victims such as foodstuffs, water, medication, … shelter … clothing …” (Principle 9).

There are no exceptions to the rights to receive and assist. The U.S. joined the GHF venture to help stop diversion of aid from civilians to Hamas fighters. There is little evidence of any substantial diversion.  Even if there was, no reason of military necessity, such as diversion of aid, justifies failure to meet the population’s survival needs. Hamas has legal duties, too. It must allow humanitarian assistance to reach the civilians. Its failure in this or any other legal duty, including the imperative obligation to free hostages, does not, however, justify Israel in failing in its duties. The obligations are independent, not reciprocal or contingent.

The most important contribution of the Principles is in directly addressing the situation where consent to assistance is withheld. Principle 6 provides: “In the case of a refusal of the offer, or of access to the victims when humanitarian assistance action is agreed upon, the States and organizations concerned may undertake all necessary steps to ensure such access…”.  Principle 7 goes further: “The competent United Nations organs and regional organizations may undertake necessary measures, including coercion, … in the event of severe, prolonged and mass suffering of populations, which could be alleviated by humanitarian assistance. These measures may be resorted to when an offer has been refused without justification…” or access denied.

Only the UN Security Council has the power to authorize the maximum form of coercion—the use of offensive force—in the context of humanitarian aid deliveries. The U.S. would likely veto any request for authorization to use force to get aid into Gaza. Even with a mandate, states would hesitate to undertake such a dangerous operation with little chance of effectively alleviating suffering. To do real good, aid distribution needs a modicum of order, not an escalation of the armed conflict.

The lesser form of coercion available in international law is through the use of countermeasures. Countermeasures are the far more appropriate tool of enforcement in the circumstances of Gaza. All states may use them because all states have the right to assist in Gaza.

Countermeasures are otherwise unlawful actions taken in response to a prior unlawful action. A party planning to impose countermeasures must inform the law violator of the intent to do so and to allow an opportunity to correct the violation. Only then may measures be imposed and only those that comply with jus cogens prohibitions, international human rights law, and IHL. Like the use of force, countermeasures must also meet the restrictions on all coercion imposed by the principles of necessity and proportionality (the law of countermeasures is discussed here).

Continuing to provide assistance in Gaza even in the face of Israeli objection would not constitute a countermeasure. It would be a mere retorsion because there is nothing unlawful about the delivery of aid. Still, it would likely be too dangerous to exercise the right. That leaves insisting on the conditions to do so. This may seem insubstantial but when coordinated among a large number of states all willing to provide aid, insistent demands on Israel might be the pressure needed for it to allow the UN and massive aid distribution to restart.

In addition, and in the meantime, drones and other high tech means and methods can be adapted to safely and effectively take advantage of the right, delivering necessities to precisely where they are needed. If enough is delivered to the right places, the violence being used for access to deliveries should wane. Limited protective force may also be used to get aid to recipients. In the Nicaragua case the ICJ stated that “there can be no doubt that the provision of strictly humanitarian aid to persons or forces in another country, whatever their political affiliations or objectives, cannot be regarded as unlawful intervention, or as in any other way contrary to international law” (Military and Paramilitary Activities, p.124-125).

Israel’s most prominent IHL scholar, Yoram Dinstein, who often favored U.S. and Israeli legal positions, wrote in 2000, “if relief is offered … civilians may have a right to insist that shipments reach their destination …”. Civilians do have this right. States and the UN have the concurrent right to help fulfill it.



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